State v. Smoke Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39064 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-16-2012
State v. Smoke Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39064
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Smoke Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39064" (2012). Not Reported. 434.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/434
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
KELO RONON SMOKE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 39064 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 6247 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 6555 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEF EN DANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5 
I. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smoke's Motion 
To Suppress ............................................................................................. 5 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................. 5 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smoke's Motion 
To Suppress ......................................................................................... 6 
II. The District Court Abused Is Discretion By Imposing A Unified 
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon 
Mr. Smoke, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In 
His Case ............................................................................................. 8 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991 ) .......................................................... 6 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ....................................................... 6 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ............................................... 6 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ............................................................ 6 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) .............................................................. 7 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) .................................................................... 6 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ................. 6 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) ...................................................... 7 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................ 5 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497 ( 1993) ......................................................... 9 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 (1991) .............................................................. 7 
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727 (2001) ................................................................ 7 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) ....................................................... 8 
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821 (Ct. App. 2002) .................................................. 6 
State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885 (2001) ................................................................. 5 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982) ................................................... 8 
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982) .................................................... 9 
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102 (1995) ...................................................... 5 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) ................................................................... 7 
United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................... 7 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ......................................................... 7 
ii 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ...................................................... 6 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 4 71 (1963) ................................................ 6 
Constitutional Provisions 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 ........................................................................................ 6 
U.S. Const. amend. IV .......................................................................................... 6 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Keio Smoke entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of trafficking in a 
controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Mr. Smoke asserts that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution were violated when the State searched his locked vehicle without a warrant 
after he was already placed under arrest for resisting and obstructing a law enforcement 
officer. Additionally, Mr. Smoke contends the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence upon him in light of the mitigating factors present in his 
case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On December 1, 2010, Mr. Smoke was pulled over by Officer James Schiffler 
after the officer observed that Mr. Smoke had fictitious plates and a canceled 
registration. (R., p.61; 5/13/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.10-18.) Mr. Smoke parked his vehicle in a 
Doubletree parking lot and exited the vehicle. (5/13/11 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-24.) 
Mr. Smoke's vehicle was not blocking traffic in the parking lot and at no point did 
Doubletree management ask that the vehicle be removed. (5/13/11 Tr., p.21, L.14 -
p.22, L.9.) Upon exiting his Ford Ranger, Mr. Smoke locked the vehicle, put his keys in 
his pocket and fled the scene, despite commands by Officer Schiffler that Mr. Smoke 
stop and get back into his truck. (5/13/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-18, p.20, Ls.6-11; R., p.61.) 
Officer Schiffler called for backup and pursued Mr. Smoke. (5/13/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.19-22, 
p.14, Ls.2-9.) 
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Officer Michael Nance and his canine, Blek, arrived on the scene just before 
Mr. Smoke was apprehended and taken into custody. (5/13/11 Tr., p.27, L.13 - p.28, 
L.9.) At that point, Officer Nance deployed Blek to conduct an open air sniff around the 
vehicle and Blek purportedly alerted on the passenger side door. (5/13/11 Tr., p.28, 
L.22 - p.29, L.12.) Officer Nance then used Mr. Smoke's keys to open the passenger 
door, eventually locating methamphetamine inside a backpack. (5/13/11 Tr., p.31, L.13 
- p.32, L.3, p.33, Ls.11-23.) At no point did Mr. Smoke ever consent to a search of his 
vehicle. (R., p.61-62; 5/13/11 Tr., p.33, Ls.8-10.) 
Mr. Smoke was charged by Information with trafficking in methamphetamine and 
possession of a controlled substance. 1 (R., pp.24-26.) Mr. Smoke filed a motion to 
suppress wherein he argued that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution were violated because the search was unreasonable under 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the police should have obtained a warrant since, 
at the time of the search, Mr. Smoke was in custody and his vehicle was locked. 
(R., pp.48-55.) Following a hearing on the motion, the district court found that the dog 
sniff of the vehicle provided probable cause for officers to search- the vehicle pursuant to. 
the "automobile search" exception to the warrant requirement. (5/13/11 Tr., p.43, L.12 -
p.47, L.5.) 
Mr. Smoke then entered a conditional plea of guilty to trafficking in a controlled 
substance, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 
(R., pp.81-88.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charge, not file a persistent violator enhancement, and recommend that the 
district court impose a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, with the 
1 Morphine Sulfate was also found. 
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defense free to argue for less. (R., pp.82-88; 6/1/11 Tr., p.49, Ls.5-11.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon 
Mr. Smoke. (R., pp.93-95.) Mr. Smoked filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district 
court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.100-102.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Smoke's motion to suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified sentence of fifteen 
years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Smoke, following his plea of guilty to 
trafficking in methamphetamine? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smoke's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Following his arrest for resisting and obstructing a law enforcement officer, 
Officer Nance deployed his canine, Blek, around the outside of Mr. Smoke's vehicle. 
After Blek allegedly alerted on the vehicle, which was not obstructing traffic, Officer 
Nance used Mr. Smoke's keys to unlock the truck and eventually located 
methamphetamine in a backpack on the passenger seat On appeal, Mr. Smoke 
asserts that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
were violated when the State searched his locked vehicle without a warrant after he was 
already placed under arrest for resisting and obstructing a law enforcement officer. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but the appellate Court 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to 
assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts and 
draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106(1995). 
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C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smoke's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I § 17. The purpose of these constitutional 
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States Supreme Court 
has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding 
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 
(1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914)). If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded 
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Warrantless searche~ are. per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a 
few narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971). One such exception is the so-called 
"automobile exception" wherein officers may search a vehicle, or the contents thereof, if 
probable cause exists to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of 
a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1991 ). The probable cause necessary to justify a search of an automobile is the 
same probable cause that is necessary to convince a magistrate to issue a search 
warrant, that is: facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a 
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person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched 
contained contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 
(1982); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Police use of a "well-trained 
narcotics-detection dog" during a lawful traffic stop is valid and generally does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). A 
drug dog's alert, in and of itself, can provide probable cause to support a search if the 
State can establish the drug dog's reliability. United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 
632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993); see also State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731 {2001); State v. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 (1991). 
Mr. Smoke is mindful of the fact that a reliable drug dog's alert can provide 
probable cause for the search of a vehicle under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. See State v. Howard, 135 Idaho at 731; State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho at 898. However, Mr. Smoke asserts that his case is distinguishable. In the 
instant case, at the time of the search, Mr. Smoke was in custody and his vehicle was 
locked. (5/13/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-18, p.20, Ls.6-11; R., p.61.) Additionally, Mr. Smoke's 
vehicle was parked in the Doubletree parking lot, not on the street, and was not blocking 
traffic. (5/13/11 Tr., p.21, L.14 - p.22, L.9.) Under the circumstances of this case, 
Mr. Smoke asserts that officers should have secured the vehicle and obtained a warrant 
prior to searching the vehicle. The automobile exception requirement is necessary 
under certain circumstances because a vehicle is readily mobile by nature. See 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996). Here, where the only driver of the vehicle 
was in custody, and the vehicle was locked and legally parked, Mr. Smoke asserts that 
officers should have obtained a warrant prior to searching the vehicle. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Smoke asserts that the district court erred in denying his 
suppression motion. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Is Discretion By Imposing A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years. With Four Years Fixed. Upon Mr. Smoke. In Light Of The Mitigating Factors 
Present In His Case 
At sentencing, the State argued that, based upon the nature of the instant 
offense and Mr. Smoke's criminal history, the district court should impose a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, upon 1\/lr. Smoke. (7/20/11 Tr., p.7, L.12 
- p.9, L.14.) Defense counsel argued an appropriate sentence would be three years 
fixed, with between five and seven years indeterminate. (7/20/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-12.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon 
Mr. Smoke. (7/20/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Smoke asserts that, given any view of the 
facts, his unified sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, is excessive. Where a 
defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence 
the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Smoke does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
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was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or 
objectives, of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary 
objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 {1993). 
Ergo, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives 
will be considered reasonable. Id.; see also State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 
(Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the 
other objectives, and therefore, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 
124 Idaho at 500. 
Mr. Smoke is the product of his alcohol and drug addictions. Of Mr. Smoke's 
previous felony convictions, all but the instant offense are felony DUls. (2/17/05 
Presentence Investigation Report (here;nafter, PSI), pp.3-7.) Mr. Smoke acknowledges 
that he has problems with both drugs and alcohol, which have not only caused his legal 
troubles, but affected his relationships with friends and family. (7/13/11 PSI, pp.4-8.) 
The good news is that not only does Mr. Smoke understand his addictions, cut he has 
the desire to become drug and alcohol free. (7/13/11 PSI, pp.9-10.) In order to 
accomplish his sobriety, Mr. Smoke desires to move to Alaska to live with his father. 
{7/13/11 PSI, pp.5-6, 9-10.) Mr. Smoke's father is fully supportive of his son and is 
willing to assist Mr. Smoke in becoming a productive member of society. (7/13/11 PSI, 
pp.5-6.) In fact, Mr. Smoke is a skilled carpenter and has the ability, once released from 
incarceration, to provide support to his father and two children. (7 /13/11 PSI, pp.7-9; 
7 /20/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-25.) 
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It is also important to note that Mr. Smoke accepts full responsibility and exhibits 
sincere remorse for his actions. Mr. Smoke's acceptance of responsibility is evidenced 
by his plea of guilty to the instant offense. Moreover, Mr. Smoke expressed to the court: 
I feel ridiculous, ashamed and embarrassed for having to appear before 
the courts for the charge of trafficking drugs as this is not who I am or the 
person I wish to be. I fully see and accept my part in this crime and 
accept all responsibility and involvement thereof. I wish only to move on 
with my life free from alcohol and drugs and pray that the court and 
commission will let me do so as soon as possible. 
(7/13/11 PSI, p.11.) 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Smoke asserts that the district court 
erred in imposing a sentence in excessive of ten years, with three years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smoke respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his suppression motion and remand his case for further proceedings. 
Alternatively, he asks that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 2012. 
ERIC EDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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